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ABSTRACT
Most government expenditure is on goods that yield primarily private benefits, such as education,
pensions, and healthcare. We argue that markets are most advantageous in areas where high-
powered incentives are desirable, but in areas where high-powered incentives stimulate unproductive
signalling effort, firms, or even government, may have a comparative advantage. Firms may be able
to weaken incentives and improve efficiency by obscuring information about individual workers'
contribution to output, and thus reducing their willingness to signal through a moral-hazard-in-teams
reasoing. However, firms themselves may be unable to commit to not providing greater
compensation to employees who distort their effots to improve observed performance. Government
organizations, on the other hand, often have to flatter wage schedules, thereby naturally weakening
the power of incentives. We suggest that there are also endogenous reasons for why governments,
even when they are run by self-interested politicians, may be able to commit to lower powered
incentives than firms, because government operation makes yardstick comparisons, which increase
the power of incentives, more difficult.
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While a range of transactions take place in markets, many important activities are
organized within ﬁrms, and are partly shielded from market incentives. Still others are
either directly or indirectly controlled by governments, with even more limited role for
market incentives. The theory of the ﬁrm, starting with the seminal contribution of
Coase [1937], has sought to identify why ﬁrms exist, what shapes their boundaries, and
which activities are likely to be organized within ﬁrms. This theory does not directly
address what determines the boundaries between ﬁrms and governments, however.
The theory of public ﬁnance, on the other hand, prescribes government intervention
to supply public goods or more generally, to correct market failures. Whatever its nor-
mative merits, this theory falls short as an empirical description of government activity
on two grounds. First, while some government expenditure is on public goods like inter-
state highways and scientiﬁc research, most public expenditure in developed countries is
on goods that yield primarily private beneﬁts, such as education, pensions, and health-
care. For example, in the United States, more than half of the non-interest, non-military
federal budget is spent by the Education Department, Social Security, and Health and
Human Services.1 Second, governments do not simply subsidize education, savings, and
health, but actually operate schools, pension systems, and hospitals. Since in most cases
the government can deal with market failures with Pigovian taxes and subsidies, and
because existing evidence shows widespread ineﬃciencies in government provision (e.g.,
Barberis, et al. [1996], La Porta et al. [1999]), the theory of public ﬁnance does not
provide an answer to the question of why governments are directly involved in the pro-
duction of many services. An alternative view links the involvement of government in
the economy to the empire-building tendencies of bureaucrats or rent-seeking behavior
of politicians (e.g., Niskanen [1971], Bates [1981], Shleifer and Vishny [1994]). This view
is consistent with widespread involvement by the government in the economy despite
its ineﬃciency, but does not provide a theory for why governments operate schools,
pensions, and health services rather than operating factories, for example.
In this paper, we develop the argument that high-powered incentives provided by
markets may have costs as well as beneﬁts, and that the relatively low-powered incentives
1See U.S. Oﬃce of Management and Budget, historical tables.
2in government operation may improve the allocation of resources (or at least carry
lower costs) in sectors where high-powered incentives are most distortionary. In this
view, the lack of incentives, often blamed as the source of government ineﬃciency, also
emerges as the factor creating a comparative advantage for governments in certain areas.
Furthermore, we use the same reasoning to show that ﬁrms may also be more useful
as an alternative form of organization with stronger incentives than governments and
weaker incentives than markets. It is useful to note from the outset that we do not
mean to argue that ours is a complete theory of the division of economic activities
between markets, ﬁrms and governments–many other factors inﬂuence the boundaries
of ﬁrms and markets (see, among others, Williamson [1985], Grossman and Hart [1986],
and Hart and Moore [1990]), and governments are clearly engaged in certain economic
activities for public goods reasons or for rent-seeking reasons. Nevertheless, we hope
that our approach will be complementary to existing theories of the ﬁrm, and will help
in understanding in which activities government intervention may be less costly, even if
it is primarily motivated by rent-seeking.2
The example of teaching, where government involvement is ubiquitous, can be used to
illustrate our argument. Markets, and the associated price system, create high-powered
incentives. In the teaching example, this corresponds to individual teachers selling their
services to parents, on the basis of their past performance (e.g., test scores of their
former pupils). This type of market organization would provide high-powered incentives
to teachers, who would have a strong incentives to improve their pupils’ performance.
But it would also encourage unproductive eﬀort to inﬂate test scores such as teaching
to the test, cream-skimming of high-quality students, or even teacher cheating. More
generally, high-powered incentives would be costly because producers could shift their
eﬀort to unproductive activities to manipulate the market’s perception of their ability
and the quality of their products.
Firms could be useful in such cases, when high-powered incentives have more costs
than beneﬁts. Firms, here interpreted as teams of producers, may be able to weaken
individual incentives by endogenously creating a moral-hazard-in-teams problem. In the
teaching example, when individual teachers are organized in schools, parents have worse
information about each teacher’s contribution to students’ learning. From the viewpoint
2In fact, in our model, government operation is controlled by a self-interested politician.
3of a teacher, this implies that any eﬀort that she exerts will lead the market to perceive
not only her, but also all the other teachers in the school, as having greater ability. This
moral-hazard-in-teams problem weakens a teacher’s incentives, and may improve the
allocation of resources when incentives provided by the market are too high-powered.
Naturally, however, as the power of incentives declines so does productive eﬀort. Firms
are therefore costly because they also reduce the amount of productive eﬀort relative to
markets, and will only arise in equilibrium when the beneﬁts of low-powered incentives
outweigh the costs in terms of lower eﬀort.
Firms may sometimes be unable to achieve low-powered incentives, however, because
even though each employee may have low-powered incentives, the ﬁrm as an entity (or its
owner) is the residual claimant of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and thus naturally has high-powered
incentives. As a result, even when each teacher has weak incentives, the school will face
a commitment problem vis-a-vis the market because it has reasons to manipulate indi-
vidual teachers’ compensation to strengthen their incentives. Consequently, it is often
impossible to prevent the high-powered incentives of the ﬁr m st h e m s e l v e sf r o mtrickling
down to their employees. For example, a ﬁrm which advertises that its salespeople are
not paid on a commission basis may nonetheless award raises or promotions to its top .
This is where governments come in. The standard view of government organizations
is one in which individuals have low-powered incentives (e.g., Crozier [1967], Tirole
[1986], Banerjee [1997]), and this is often viewed as a major source of ineﬃciency in
government activities (e.g., Niskanen [1971], Hanushek [1996]). Our perspective sug-
gests that the low-powered incentives might also be the reason why certain activities
should be (and perhaps are) operated by governments. There are a number of theories
for why incentives in government are low-powered. Yet, to assume that those controlling
the government do not have proﬁt-maximizing interests or do not care about the mar-
ket’s perception of their success would be too extreme–if parents care about teacher
performance when schools are private, they will also do so when they are public, and
reward politicians in charge of schools accordingly. Nevertheless, we show that even in
this case, there is a reason for incentives in government organizations to be weaker: the
absence of yardstick competition. In the teaching example, when a school (or individual
teacher) improves its performance, it will be favorably compared to others that have not
4done so.3 This comparison (yardstick) eﬀect is missing for the government, weakening
the incentives at the top of the government, even for self-interested politicians in charge
of government activity. This lack of comparison creates a trickle-down of low-powered
incentives in the whole government organization.4
Our analysis therefore suggests that industries for which high-powered incentives are
desirable and there is little scope for unproductive signaling eﬀort should operate as
markets. An important determinant of whether there is a large scope for signaling is
the degree of uncertainty regarding success in past performance and the quality of the
services provided. In light of this, occupations where productive eﬀort (or selection of
the appropriate candidates) is important and where performance is easy to observe, such
as in the entertainment and sports industries or in the production of relatively simple
goods, are natural candidates for market organization. Activities where high-powered
incentives could lead to detrimental signaling and where group reputation could dull
incentives should be organized as ﬁrms. Examples may include most durable goods
manufacturing, consulting services, or journalism. Because “Mom-and-pop” operations
in these ﬁelds may have too much incentive to falsely advertise or exaggerate their past
performance for quality, the lower-powered incentives prevalent in large corporations
might be preferable. Perhaps for this reason, durable goods retailers and many ﬁnancial
service ﬁrms advertise that their employees do not work on commission.5
At the other extreme, government operation may be appropriate for tasks where it is
diﬃcult for customers to accurately separate true quality from eﬀorts to signal quality,
and where ﬁrms cannot commit to low-powered incentives to build a reputation against
low-quality work.6 Nevertheless, government ownership may also be quite costly because
3On relative performance evaluation and yardstick competition, see, among others, Green and Stokey
[1983] and Shleifer [1985].
4Note that the argument here is one for government control rather than direct government operation.
Under certain circumstances, regulation by the government may achieve similar results, though there
are natural reasons, related to incompleteness of contracts and ex post bargaining/renegotiation, for
why government regulation of privately-owned ﬁrms may not work very well. On the other hand, if
issues of incomplete contracts are unimportant and government regulation can produce exactly the
same allocation as government operation, we might want to think of eﬀective government regulation as
equivalent to direct government operation.
5Large corporations may also be able to build up a reputation for quality and for not encouraging
their employees to mislead customers because of their high-powered incentives.
6We abstract from reputation in our model, but it is worth noting that it may be particularly diﬃcult
to build reputation in areas where it takes a long time to determine quality, in part because incentives
to deviate from the high-reputation strategy would be strong. For example, a pension fund that takes
5of the usual ineﬃciencies and lack of incentives associated with government operations.
This suggests that government operation/ownership should only arise in activities where
overall eﬀort is relatively unimportant, and the tendency of the private sector to signal
quality is signiﬁcantly greater than the ability of politicians to signal their competence
by using government performance in these areas. The latter condition is more likely to be
met when there are limited opportunities for politicians to signal their competencies, or
equivalently, when their actions or abilities have only limited eﬀects on outcomes (other
than through the incentives they provide to teachers, for example). Possible activities
where government operation might be preferable to markets and ﬁrms, for the reasons
outlined here, include teaching, pensions, healthcare, and law enforcement.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of our model in a stark way:
Table 1
No commitment Commitment
problems in ﬁrms/ problems in ﬁrms/
signaling by limited signaling
politicians important by politicians
High-powered incentives beneﬁcial/ Markets Markets
product quality observable
High-powered incentives costly/ Firms Governments
product quality not observable
At this point it is worth considering a few areas where governments play major roles
in the provision of private goods. A large share of primary and secondary education
provision is by the state in almost all countries, and in many countries this provision is
highly centralized. (The United States, with its local school boards, is an exception).
Even if one accepts the case for subsidizing education, it is unclear why governments
operate schools, rather than simply subsidizing them. Consistent with the model, incen-
tives are weaker in governments, and there is evidence that high-powered incentives in
markets create major distortions. Harbison and Hanushek [1992] and Hanushek [1996]
document that public school teachers have much ﬂatter pay schedules than their private
counterparts, and argue that this leads to low eﬀort. However, an emerging body of work
big risks may have high returns in the short-run and very bad outcomes only with low frequency.
6shows that high-powered incentives in schools create adverse incentives and signiﬁcant
eﬀorts by teachers to artiﬁcially inﬂate their pupils performance. For example, Glewwe,
et al. [2003] ﬁnd evidence that existing teacher incentives in Kenya are indeed weak,
with teachers absent 20% of the time. They report on a randomized evaluation of a
program that provided primary school teachers in rural Kenya with incentives based on
students’ test scores. During the time the program was in place, students in program
schools had higher test scores. An examination of the channels through which this eﬀect
took place, however, provides little evidence of more teacher eﬀort aimed at increasing
long-run learning. Teacher attendance did not improve, homework assignment did not
increase, and pedagogy did not change. There is, however, evidence that teachers in-
creased eﬀort to raise short-run test scores by conducting more test preparation sessions.
While students in treatment schools scored higher than their counterparts in compari-
son schools during the life of the program, they did not retain these gains after the end
of the program, consistent with the hypothesis that teachers focused on manipulating
short-run scores.
Similar results are obtained in U. S. studies. Jacob [2002] investigates the eﬀects
of the No Child Left Behind education bill in Chicago Public Schools, which provided
stronger incentives to teachers. He shows that this program led to a signiﬁcant increase in
math and reading achievement scores, but that these increases were inﬂuenced by teach-
ing of test-speciﬁc skills, and that there were no comparable gains on state-administered
exams. In a related study, Jacob and Levitt [2002] ﬁnd substantial increases in teacher
cheating in response to the introduction of high-powered incentives in Chicago. Similarly,
Figlio and Winicki [2002] look at the link between nutrition and short-term cognitive
functioning, and ﬁnd that school districts in Virginia increase the number of calories in
school lunches on days when high-stakes tests are administered, thus artiﬁcially inﬂating
test scores.
Evidence from the three countries which have moved farthest in introducing markets
into education, Chile, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, is also consistent with the
notion that moving to a more market-oriented system leads to high-powered incentives
and carries signiﬁcant costs. Hsieh and Urqiola [2002] argue that competition among
private schools in Chile’s voucher program in part takes the form of trying to recruit
strong students who will raise average scores and making cosmetic changes to school
7appearance. Ladd and Fiske [2000] ﬁnd similar eﬀects in New Zealand. Although Glen-
nerster [2002] has a positive overall assessment of recent British eﬀorts to establish a
quasi-market in education and publish league tables of comparative school performance,
he notes that test score gains on U.K. exams were not matched by comparable gains
on international exams. This is consistent with the possibility that schools may have
focused on preparing students for the exams used to prepare the league tables, rather
than on broader measures of learning.
Similar issues arise in the administration of pensions. Pension systems are often run
by governments, though they provide private goods. Diamond and Valdes-Prieto [1994]
argue that in systems like the Chilean one, run by private ﬁrms, administrative costs
are substantially higher than well-managed government-run systems.7 The bulk of the
additional administrative costs comes from “advertising,” whereby individual funds try
to raise their performance appearance, without any apparent direct beneﬁts, which has
ap a r a l l e lt oe x e r t i n gb a de ﬀort in our model. This is also consistent with the evidence
in Chevalier and Ellison [1999] that U.S. mutual fund managers have signiﬁcant career
concerns and consequently manipulate the composition of their investments in ways that
may not be in the best interest of mutual fund investors.8
Finally, our mechanism also suggests possible reasons for why healthcare and law
enforcement may be government provided. With private provision, healthcare providers
may compete to improve their reputation by taking actions that make people feel better
in the short-run but do not improve their long-run health. For example, U.S. hospitals
provide more non-medical amenities than British hospitals, which face less competition.
While it is certainly possible that British hospitals may be providing sub-optimal non-
medical amenities, the evidence is also consistent with the notion that in the more
market-based U.S. system, hospitals are trying to signal quality by providing easily
observed non-medical amenities. This would suggest that the ratio of spending on these
amenities to spending on medical care is too high in the United States, and perhaps
7For example, in Malaysia, where the government runs and manages the pension system, the Em-
ployees’ Provident Fund costs U.S.$10 a year per active aﬃliate to administer or 0.32 percent of annual
covered earnings. In Chile, the administrative costs average U.S.$51.6 a year or 1.70 percent of annual
covered earnings.
8The long time periods involved in pensions and the presence of many unsophisticated investors
make pensions more prone to signaling and quality-boosting advertising and increases the potential
costs of high-powered incentives for pensions relative to many other types of ﬁnancial intermediation.
8explains why the U.K. manages to achieve health outcomes nearly as good as the United
States, while spending only 7.3% of GDP on health compared to the 13% the United
States spends.9 Finally, law enforcement agents with too high-powered incentives may
frame innocent people to appear more able to solve crimes, so regulation of incentives
might again be necessary.10
Although a range of other factors undoubtedly aﬀect the division of production ac-
tivities between markets, ﬁrms and governments, we believe that the role of diﬀerent
organizations in regulating the power of incentives is an important, and largely ignored,
element. In emphasizing these issues, we focus on ﬁrms as teams of producers, thus de-
parting from the most popular theory of the ﬁrm, which identiﬁes ﬁrms with ownership of
assets (e.g., Williamson [1985], Grossman and Hart [1986], and Hart and Moore [1990]),
and analyzes how asset ownership shapes (investment) incentives. Our approach is com-
plementary as we emphasize how incentives diﬀer in ﬁrms, markets, and governments,
b u tw ed on o td e ﬁne ﬁrms with reference to asset ownership.11 Instead here ﬁrms are
deﬁned by team production, which ensures that markets learn relatively little about the
performance of each member. Another, perhaps more important, diﬀerence between this
literature and our paper is the impact of ﬁrms on incentives. In current literature, the
major problem is low-powered incentives because of ex post rent-sharing, and ﬁrms are
formed in order to improve incentives and encourage investments (though see Rajan and
Zingales [1998] on how high-powered incentives associated with ownership can lead to
too much specialization). In contrast, the problem in our setting is “too high-powered”
incentives, and ﬁrms are useful as they ﬂatten these incentives. Naturally, in practice
both roles are likely to be present.
Our paper is also closely related to the career concerns literature (e.g., Holmstrom
[1999], Stein [1989], Meyer and Vickers [1997], Dewatripont, et al. [1999]), and to the
multi—tasking literature (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991] and [1994]), which also
emphasizes the costs of high-powered incentives, though does not develop a theory of
9See OECD Health Data 2002, Table 10.
10In the case of law enforcement, another concern is the potential cost of delegating part of the
legitimate use of coercion to non-state agents.
11It is possible to extend our model so as to deﬁne ﬁrm boundaries by asset ownership. The interaction
between incentives provided by asset ownership and the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the composition of eﬀort
might be an interesting area for future research.
9organizational form from these ideas.12 T h er o l eo fﬁrms as institutions for suppression
of information has been discussed by other authors, in particular Gibbons [1998] and
Gibbons and Murphy [1992], but not in a context where suppression of information
is useful for weakening incentives and improving the composition of eﬀort. Moreover,
this work assumes that ﬁrms have no commitment problem, and therefore provides
no role for the government. Acemoglu [1998] suggests an argument for separation of
ownership and control in ﬁrms so that agents making ﬁnancing decisions do not have
too high-powered incentives, which might be detrimental in the presence of asymmetric
information. Kremer [1997] argues that worker cooperatives typically have egalitarian
wage schedules because the median voter in a cooperative will choose a wage schedule
which redistributes from high- to low-ability workers. Redistribution in cooperatives
will dull incentives for ex post eﬀort, which is typically undesirable, but may be useful
in sectors where workers would otherwise waste eﬀort on unproductive signaling. A
recent paper by Levin and Tadelis [2002] is also related–they emphasize the beneﬁts
of ﬁrms in manipulating incentives because of joint production, though their story is
non-informational and static.
A number of other papers have sought to understand why governments run and
control certain activities. Hart, et al. [1997] use the incomplete contracts approach to
explain why governments run prisons, and attempt to deﬁne what the proper scope of
governments should be. With private ownership, managers receive a greater share of the
gains they create, but this also induces them to engage in too much cost-cutting at the
expense of quality. We share with this paper the emphasis on the potential costs of high-
powered incentives associated with private ownership, but in our setup, these incentives
arise not because of bargaining between the government and managers, but from the
career concerns of producers, and diﬀerent ownership structures aﬀect incentives by
inﬂuencing information transmission and the degree of career concerns.13
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and
12The literature on advertising with imperfect information about quality is also related in this context,
though the focus is on the costs of advertising to reveal quality by high-quality suppliers (e.g., see
Kihlstrom and Riordan [1984] for Milgrom and Roberts [1986]).
13Bowles and Gintis [1976], Lott [1999], Kremer and Sarychev [1997], and Pritchett [2002] suggest
that governments may run schools in order to control what ideology is taught to students. See also
Acemoglu and Verdier [2000] and Prendergast [2003] on how government intervention or bureaucratic
decision-making may create ineﬃciencies even when they are potentially improving the allocation of
resources.
10characterizes optimal incentives in the context of a simple mechanism design problem.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 then compare the incentive structure under markets, ﬁrms, and
governments. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the main ﬁndings.
2M o d e l
We now outline the basic model. For concreteness, we will focus on the teaching example,
but the theoretical argument is more general.
2.1 The environment
Consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with n inﬁnitely lived teachers, and n0 >nparents
in each period who would like to send their children to teachers for education. Each
parent has one child, who can be matched with one teacher in every period. A teacher
can only teach to one student at a time. Each teacher, i, is endowed with a teaching
ability ai
t at the beginning of period t. The exact level of ai
t is unknown, but both
teacher i and parents share the same belief about the distribution of ai
t. The common















t is i.i.d. with ε v N(0,σ 2
ε). The disturbance term ε could result from personal
shocks, or it could reﬂect the ability of the teacher to adapt to changing education
demands and technology.
We consider a multi-tasking environment where a teacher can exert two types of
eﬀort, “good” and “bad”, denoted by gi
t and bi
t respectively. The titles “good” and
“bad” reﬂect the social value of these eﬀorts. The total output of a teacher is calculated
through the education or human capital, hi
t, that she provides to her student. hi
t depends








11where f(g) is increasing and strictly concave in g, with f(0) = 0,a n dhi
t =0if the child
is not taught by a teacher.
Parents only care about the level of human capital provided to their children. The
expected utility of a parent at time t is given by:
U
P
t = Et [ht] − wt,
where Et [·] denotes expectations with respect to publicly available information at the
beginning of time t and δ<1 i st h ed i s c o u n tr a t e ,a n dw is the wage paid to the teacher.
There is perfect competition among parents for education, so each parent pays a
teacher a wage wi


























t+τ denotes the wage of the teacher at time t + τ.
The main assumption is that the true level of hi
t provided by a teacher is not observ-










t + ηt (3)
where γ ≥ 0, θ
i
t is an i.i.d. student-level shock distributed as N(0,σ 2
θ), for example,
the ability of the students to learn or a summary measure of some other inﬂuences
on the student’s human capital. ηt is a common shock that every teacher receives in
period t. For example, if all students are given the same test, ηt can be thought of as
the overall diﬃculty of the test, or any other cohort-speciﬁcd i ﬀerence in ability or pre-
schooling human capital. ηt is distributed i.i.d. and N(0,σ2
η).T h ev a r i a n c eσ2
θ measures
the quality of signal si
t, while the variance of the common shock, σ2
η,a l s oa ﬀects the
informativeness of the signal. The lower these variances, the more precise the signal
is in measuring the human capital contribution of teachers. Notice that the signal of
14The information contained in past student performance is already incorporated in Et [ht],a n dw e
are assuming here that current and future student performances are not directly contractible.
12human capital is imperfect in two ways. First, shocks θ and η make the test score a
noisy signal for the student’s human capital. Second, the signal can be inﬂated if the
teacher exerts bad eﬀort. The parameter γ measures the extent to which the signal can
be manipulated by bad eﬀort. It also captures the importance of output quality and
composition of eﬀort relative to the amount of eﬀort (i.e., as γ declines, the importance
of ensuring a high level of total eﬀort increases).
The reason for calling the two types of eﬀorts good and bad should be apparent now.
Parents, as well as the society, only care about the good eﬀort exerted by the teacher,
since that determines the level of human capital h that the children receive. However,
parents only observe the signal s, which can be manipulated by bad , as shown by
equation (3). In real life, good eﬀort can be thought of as real or honest teaching, where
the teacher tries to ensure that the children understand conceptually what has been
taught to them. Bad eﬀort, on the other hand, may correspond to what is commonly
r e f e r r e dt oa s“ t e a c h i n gt ot h et e s t ” . I ti n v o l v e sr o t el e a r n i n g ,w h e r et h et e a c h e rj u s t
forces the students to cram certain essential facts or methods, without explaining the
concepts behind them or the connection between the various facts and phenomena (see
Hanaway [1992]). Such cramming is useless (or at least less useful than good eﬀort)
in terms of the human capital of the students, but it serves to inﬂate their test scores.
Bad eﬀort might also be interpreted as teacher cheating, which improves test scores,
but clearly has no beneﬁcial eﬀect on pupils’ human capital. In the context of the
pension funds example as well as some other applications, we can think of bad eﬀort as
any activity that improves observed performance without aﬀecting actual performance
equally (e.g., advertising).
The timing of events in this world is as follows. In the beginning of every period t,
parents form priors, mi
t, on the abilities of teachers based on the historical test scores
of the teachers. They then oﬀer a wage wi
t based on the expected ability of the teacher
working with their child. The teacher then decides on the levels of good and bad eﬀort,
and h and s are realized at the end of period t. Ability ai
t is then updated according to
the stochastic process (1). The process then repeats itself in period t +1 .







τ=0,1,.. optimally given their rewards, and the beliefs about
teacher ability are given by Bayesian updating, given equilibrium behavior. We will
13also focus on the long-run of the model so that the variance of each teacher’s ability
is constant, i.e. vt = vt+1 = v. F i n a l l y ,i nt h et e x t ,w ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r en is
very large, i.e., n →∞(the Appendix gives equations that apply for n<∞ as well).
The n →∞assumption allows us to ignore the common shock, ηt,s i n c ei nal a r g e
population, the average ability of the entire population of teachers is known for sure.
Thus the common shock can be backed out from the average of all test score signals in
t h ep o p u l a t i o n . T h ec o m m o ns h o c kw i l lp l a ya ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nS e c t i o n5w h e nw e
discuss the incentives with government-provided education.
2.2 Updating beliefs
We ﬁrst determine how beliefs about teacher i0s ability will be updated at the end of
period t b a s e do nn e wi n f o r m a t i o nr e v e a l e dd u r i n gp e r i o dt. Parents’ belief about teacher
i at the beginning of period t can be summarized as, ai
t v N(mi
t,v t). Let St =[ s1
t ......
sn
t ]T denote the vector of n test scores that the agents observe during period t.
Along the rational expectations equilibrium path, parents correctly infer eﬀort levels
gi
t and bi
t chosen by the teachers–or speciﬁc a l l yb yt e a c h e ri in this case. This means
that parents can back out the part of St which only reﬂects the ability levels of the
teachers, plus the noise. Let Zt =[ z1
t ...... zn
















t+1 be the updated prior on teacher i’s ability conditional on observing Zt.T h e n
the normality of the error terms and the additive structure in equation (3) imply that
ai
t+1 v N(mi
t+1,v t+1) where mi
t+1 and vt+1 denote the mean and the variance of the
posterior distribution.
Using the normal updating formula for variance vt+1, setting vt+1 = vt = v and












































t is the ith element of the vector Zt, and refers to the signal from teacher i, while z
−i
t




t ) → ηt,
so the common shock is completely revealed and can be ﬁltered out. The proof of (4)
and (5) is given in the Appendix, where we also provide the expressions for the case of
n ﬁnite.
The equation (4) illustrates the relative performance evaluation (yardstick competi-
tion) in the presence of ηt.T h ec o e ﬃcient β captures relative performance evaluation.
It emphasizes that an improvement in the score of a teacher creates a negative eﬀect on
the market’s assessment of other teachers.
The following lemma summarizes some important properties of the updating formula
for future reference:
Lemma 1 P a r e n t su p d a t et h e i rb e l i e f sa b o u tt e a c h e ri0s ability level, according to equa-
tions (4) and (5), where 1 >β>0.βis increasing in σ2
ε, and decreasing in σ2
θ.
The intuition behind the last part of Lemma 1 is that any increase in the variance of
θ, σ2
θ, increases the noise in the signal, and makes it less valuable, and hence reduces β.
An increase in σ2
ε makes the signal more valuable due to a greater change in ability since
last period. In other words, a greater σ2
θ relative to σ2
ε implies that a given variation
in test scores is less likely to come from teacher ability, so parents put less weight on
diﬀerences in test scores in updating their posterior about teacher ability.
2.3 Eﬃcient Allocations
We deﬁne social welfare at time t, UW
t , as the sum of the teachers’ and parents’ utilities.
Since the ability of teacher i enters additively in a teacher’s utility function, all teachers








τ(A + f(gt+τ) − gt+τ − bt+τ) (6)
15where A is the average ability of teachers in the population, and gt+τ and bt+τ are
the good and bad eﬀort levels chosen by all teachers. Since in the case n →∞ ,e a c h
individual teacher’s ability is a random walk, the average ability level of the population
does not vary over time.
First Best: Maximizing (6) gives us the ﬁrst-best. In the ﬁrst-best, there is no bad
eﬀort, bt =0 , and the level of good eﬀort, gFB, is given by f0(gFB)=1 .
Second-Best: The ﬁrst-best is useful as a benchmark. Nevertheless, since teacher eﬀort
and the level of human capital are not directly observable, a more useful benchmark is







t−1] be the information set containing the vector of
test scores for teacher i at the beginning of period t. Ωi
t summarizes all contractible
information about teacher i up to t.L e twi
t(Ωi
t) b et h ew a g ep a i dt ot e a c h e ri in period
t. Then the constrained maximization problem to determine the second-best allocation







t subject to (7)


















Solving (7) above gives us the following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 1 The second-best solution is given by gt+k = gSB,a n dbt+k = bSB for all
k,w i t hgSB <g FB. The optimal wage schedule is given by an aﬃne transformation of
the function wi
t = αSBmi
t + κ for
α
SB =
1 − δ(1 − β)
δβf0 (gSB)
, (8)
and for any nonnegative κ. Both gSB and αSB are monotonically decreasing in γ ,a n d
we have αSB < 1,f o rγ>γ .
Proposition 1 highlights the trade-oﬀ that the social planner faces given the informa-
tional constraints. The planner needs to provide incentives to teachers in order to induce
eﬀort. However, high-powered incentives lead to both good and bad eﬀort. This associ-
ation between good and bad eﬀort increases the shadow cost of increasing good eﬀort,
16leading to a lower level of good eﬀort in the second-best relative to the ﬁrst-best. The
parameter γ captures the cost of higher incentives in the form of bad eﬀort. Hence, an
increase in γ increases the scope for bad eﬀort and reduces the optimal level of incentives
for the teacher, αSB, and the second-best level of good eﬀort, gSB .
Equivalently, Proposition 1 can be understood in terms of two diﬀerent types of
negative externalities created by bad eﬀort. The ﬁrst type of negative externality is
d r i v e nf r o mt h ef a c tt h a ts i n c et h ee ﬀort levels are directly unobservable, the market’s
expectation of any individual teacher’s eﬀort level (which they back out in equilibrium)
is based on the expectation of the market as a whole: when a teacher (or a positive
mass of teachers) is expected to exert bad eﬀort, a given test score translates into a









t ) and zi
t = si
t − f(gt) − γf(bt) where bt is the level of bad
eﬀort that teachers are expected to exert. Greater bt reduces zi
t,t h u st h ep e r c e i v e d
ability of other teachers. This negative externality is at the root of the ineﬃciency
of various organizations. The second type of externality is driven by the presence of
relative performance evaluation to back out ηt. Such evaluation creates a more direct
negative externality from the actual level of bad eﬀort by a teacher (as opposed to the
expectation of bad eﬀort): as a teacher exerts more bad eﬀort, she increases parents’
posterior about the common shock, ηt, and reduces their posterior about other teachers’
abilities. However, as long as we assume that n →∞ , this second type of externality is
driven down to zero (since the common shock is completely revealed).15
It is also noteworthy that with the wage schedule wt = αmt +κ, teachers are driven
entirely by career concerns. There are no eﬀort contingent contracts. Teachers are
paid a wage every period depending on their perceived ability. This formulation of
incentives is similar to the seminal career concerns paper by Holmstrom [1999]. The
extra eﬀo r tp u ti nb yt h et e a c h e ri np e r i o dt increases her test score in period t. There
are no immediate rewards for this increase as the teacher has already been paid her
wage. However, an increase in the test score at t increases the perceived ability of
the teacher in period t +1due to the updating rule (4). Moreover, because of the
recursive nature of (4), the increase in perceived ability in t +1has a (progressively
15This argument also shows that when n<∞ and n declines, externality becomes stronger and the
gap between the the second best and the ﬁrst best widens.
17dampened) ripple eﬀect on all future expected abilities. Hence the present discounted




1−δ(1−β). Notice that the marginal beneﬁto fah i g h e r
test score is increasing in β,w h i c hi st h ec o e ﬃcient on an individual teacher’s test score
in the ability updating rule. We thus deﬁne β as the “career-concerns coeﬃcient”. The
marginal beneﬁti sa l s oi n c r e a s i n gi nα, which can be thought of as “the market-reward
coeﬃcient”–how much the market rewards a unit increase in the perceived ability of the
teacher. Expression (8) can be understood as ensuring that the market-reward coeﬃcient
is at the right level to ensure an eﬀort level of gSB given the career-concerns coeﬃcient
implied by Bayesian updating, (5).16
The following corollary emphasizes that second-best eﬀort can be achieved, alterna-
tively, by manipulating β (if this were possible).
Corollary The second-best equilibrium can alternatively be described by ﬁxing α,a n d






This discussion highlights two diﬀerent channels via which the second-best allocation
can be obtained. The ﬁrst is by manipulating α, i.e., how the market rewards “success,”
and the second is by manipulating β, i.e., the teachers’ career concerns. In the sections
that follow, we discuss how successful diﬀerent organizational forms are in manipulating
the career-concerns coeﬃcient to improve the allocation of resources.
3 Incentives in markets
The second-best solution highlights the trade-oﬀ in providing greater incentives to teach-
ers. While high-powered incentives are good for increasing good eﬀort, they also lead to
an increase in bad eﬀort, which, as emphasized above, creates a negative externality and
is costly. In this and the next two sections, we consider three diﬀerent organizational
16This discussion raises the possibility of beneﬁcial government regulation directly manipulating α,
for example, by tax policy. We do not consider this possibility since diﬀerential taxation of income from
diﬀerent occupations is rare in practice, and potentially very costly for a variety of reasons, including
the distortions of such tax policies on the allocation of resources and talent across occupations.
18structures–markets, ﬁrms, and governments–and compare the incentives they provide
to teachers.
Consider ﬁrst the textbook model of perfectly competitive markets. Every teacher
works independently, and sells her teaching services in the market each period. There is
perfect competition among parents for education, and as a result each teacher gets paid










The market equilibrium is therefore identical to the second-best equilibrium, except that
now α is ﬁx e dt ob e1 .T h i sl e a d st ot h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .






1 − δ(1 − β)
δβ
.
We have that gM <g SB if γ<γ , and gM >g SB if γ>γ .
The proof follows from Proposition 1. The result that gM <g SB if γ<γis similar
to the result in Holmstrom [1999] that, with discounting, career concerns are typically
insuﬃcient to induce the optimal level of eﬀort. So in this case, even markets do not
provide strong enough incentives. There may be certain non-market institutions (e.g.
tournaments) that may strengthen incentives even further, though we do not focus on
those here.17 Therefore, when γ<γ , markets are the preferred form of organization.
This leads to the conclusion, mentioned above, that where quality concerns are unim-
portant relative to the total amount of eﬀort/investments, services should be sold in
markets.
T h ec a s ew h e r eγ>γ , on the other hand, leads to the opposite conclusion. Now the
natural career concerns provided by the market equilibrium create too high-powered in-
centives relative to the second-best. The extent to which the market provides excessively
17One can also imagine organizations that reward teachers according to a wage function along the
lines of wi
t = αmi
t + κ with α>1 to strengthen incentives beyond those provided by the market.
Firms, modeled below as teams of teachers, are unable to do so, however, since the “balanced budget”
requirement imposes that α ≤ 1 and κ ≥ 0. See Holmstrom [1979].
19high-powered incentives depends on the career-concerns coeﬃcient, β, and via this, on
σ2
θ and σ2
ε.W h e nσ2
θ is small relative to σ2
ε, β is high, and teachers in the market care a
lot about their pupils scores, giving them very high-powered incentives.
In the case with γ>γ , since markets are encouraging too much bad eﬀort, ﬁrms or
governments may be useful by modifying the organization of production to dull incen-
tives. We next turn to a discussion of the role of ﬁrms and governments in providing
appropriate incentives when markets lead to too-high-powered incentives, i.e., when γ
>γ .
4I n c e n t i v e s i n ﬁrms
The previous section showed that the presence of competitive forces can lead to powerful
incentives, even when it is socially optimal to have lower-powered incentives. We now
consider how ﬁrms can attempt to overcome these problems by creating teams of teachers
to weaken the signaling ability of individual teachers. In doing so, we provide a theory
of the ﬁrm based upon the advantages that ﬁrms provide over pure markets in terms of
providing duller incentives.
We model the ﬁrm as a partnership of K teachers working together.18 The teachers
are now organized as a team that is engaged in joint production of teaching. As a result,









for some teacher k in ﬁrm j.
W h a tm a k e st e a c h e r si n s i d eaﬁrm diﬀerent from teachers in a market environment
is the fact that the parents only observe the aggregate or average test score of all the
teachers (or pupils) in the ﬁrm. Therefore, an important function of ﬁrms in one economy
is to shut down the individual signals (test scores) of teachers.
More speciﬁcally, consider an allocation where there are J ﬁrms in the economy with
the jth ﬁrm made up of Kj teachers, so that
PJ
j=1 Kj = n.M o r e o v e r , w e t h i n k o f
Kj < ∞ for all j,s ot h a ta sn →∞ ,w ea l s oh a v eJ →∞ . Denote the set of teachers
constituting ﬁrm j by Kj and index teachers within each ﬁrm by k. T h em a r k e tt h e n
18T h er e s u l t sa r es i m i l a ri fw em o d e lt h eﬁrm as a corporation with a single owner.
20observes J signals every period, where each signal is the average test score of all the
teachers in the ﬁrm. Let s
j































































be the expected ability of the ﬁrm j at time t. Then parents update their belief about














Although parents can only observe the average test score of all the teachers in the ﬁrm,
i ti si nt h e o r yp o s s i b l ef o rt h o s ei n s i d et h eﬁrm to have more information about each
individual teacher’s performance. We assume that, in addition to the average test score














t + ηt, (14)
where e θ
jk
t is a normal error term, distributed as N(0,σ 2
e θ).W h e nσ2
e θ →∞ ,s ot h a te θ
jk
t
has a very large variance, we obtain the case where insiders observe exactly the same
information as outsiders – i.e. there is no “asymmetry of information”. We will start
with this case of no asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and then
analyze the case where insiders have better information than the market.
Bertrand competition between parents again ensures that a group of teachers will
be paid their expected contribution to human capital. Thus the average earnings of a












t. The average perception of the teachers in ﬁrm j is deﬁned above in (12).
214.1 Symmetric information–σ2
e θ →∞
In this case, the ﬁr mc a no n l ym a k ep a y m e n t st ot e a c h e r sc o n d i t i o n a lo nt h ep a s th i s t o r y
of s
j
t, the average signal from all the teachers (as well as the initial prior about the
individual teacher). We assume that the objective of the ﬁrm is to maximize total net
returns of all the employees in the ﬁrm. We also assume that the set of teachers in ﬁrm
j, Kj, is chosen at time t and is not changed thereafter. In other words, teachers do not

































t+τ is given by (15) and Kj denotes the total number of teachers in that ﬁrm.
w
j
t, gt+τ,and bt+τ are written as functions of Kj to emphasize that the size of the ﬁrm
will inﬂuence incentives and payments. In addition, the maximization is over the choice




t is the sum of the outside options of the
teachers and also acts as a convenient normalization. This normalization makes it clear
that the maximization is identical to the simpler maximization problem over the size of



























The objective function of the ﬁrm is not enough to determine individual incentives,
however. We also need to know how each individual teacher is rewarded. We assume
19It can be shown that, as long as we are in the case with γ>γ , “no switching” is a long-run
equilibrium. To see this brieﬂy, consider a symmetric long-run equilibrium. Every teacher is paid her






every period. In the long-run equilibrium, g is constant
over time and across all teachers. Hence, the future expected utility of a teacher if she stays in the











t+τ + f(g) − g − b
´¸














. Now suppose that a teacher deviates
and switches to another ﬁrm. Compute his/her utility assuming that in all future periods, he/she is





t , so her utility is still given by U
jk
t above, and there is no gain in switching. In addition,
after switching teams, market perceptions of abilities in the new and the old teams of the teacher who
switched will be negatively correlated. This will induce the teacher who switches to put in more eﬀort
(both good and bad). As long as γ>γ , this will be rewarded by the market less than the cost of eﬀort,
and hence greater eﬀort will reduce the utility of the switching teacher. XXX










t is given by (13). This wage rule rewards each teacher according to her
contribution to the ﬁrm’s revenues. Such a wage rule will result from a variety of
diﬀerent micro-foundations, for example, when each teacher makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to the “ﬁrm”. This wage rule also parallels the market wage rule, (10), thus making
it clear that the advantage of ﬁrms does not come from manipulating the wage rule, but
from obscuring information.
What are the beneﬁts of having large ﬁrms? To answer this question, let us return
to the updating equation, (13), which is similar to the updating equation in the market
case, (4). The career-concerns coeﬃcient for an individual teacher is diﬀerent, however.
In particular, in a ﬁrm of size K, the individual career-concerns coeﬃcient is
βF
K .T h e
reason for this decline is the “moral-hazard-in-teams” problem. For each incremental
increase in her test score, a teacher only gets rewarded for a fraction 1
K of the value
created for the team Moreover, as the proof to Proposition 3 in the Appendix will show,
βF = β, and βF = β. Since
β
K is decreasing in K, the power of incentives can be
reduced by increasing ﬁrm size, and in the case where γ>γ ,t h e r ee x i s t saK∗ such that
β
K∗ = βSB where βSB is the career-concerns coeﬃcient that would ensure the second-best
with α =1 ,a sd e ﬁned by equation (9). Moreover, given that the maximization problem
in (16) is identical to the social surplus maximization problem (6), the ﬁrm will select
K = K∗, and the second-best outcome is attained. This gives us the following result:
Proposition 3 Suppose that σ2
e θ →∞ .T h e nf o raﬁrm of size K, the good eﬀort level
chosen by a teacher, g,i sg i v e nb ygF(K),w h e r egF is monotonically decreasing in K
with gF(1) = gM and gF(K) → 0 as K →∞ .
When γ>γ , there exists a unique equilibrium where ﬁr m sh a v es i z ee q u a lt oK∗ =
β/βSB > 1 and where teachers exert the second-best level of good eﬀort, gSB.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Here we outline the intuition behind the result.
As in the market equilibrium, a teacher is still paid her expected output. However, the
marginal eﬀect of test score at time t on future expected ability is lower in ﬁrms than in
markets. In other words, ﬁrms lower the career-concerns coeﬃcient from β to
β
K,t h u s
weakening individual incentives.
23The reduction of career concerns eﬀects under ﬁrms can thus completely resolve the
“over-incentivization” problem. With ﬁrms of appropriate size, the second-best alloca-
tion of Section 2.3 is achieved. When ﬁrms compete to maximize their value, all ﬁrms
will endogenously expand to the optimal size K∗,s i n c eb yd e ﬁnition K∗ gives the max-
imum of (16). As a result, the size of the ﬁrms here arises as a means to dull incentives.
4.2 Asymmetric information and the commitment problem–
σ2
e θ < ∞
The idea that the outside market only observes the average and not individual test scores
of teachers is meant to capture the idea that the organizational structure of ﬁrms can
be used to mask or suppress information. The question still remains, however, as to
what extent the ﬁrm as a whole (or the principal/the owner) has access to information
regarding an individual teacher’s test score. Proposition 3 above implicitly assumed that
nobody in the ﬁrm is able to observe individual teachers’ test scores either. Alternatively,
the allocation in Proposition 3 can be achieved if ﬁrms can announce a wage contract of
the form (17), i.e., one that does not make any use of non-publicly available information,
for all of their employees, and make a strict commitment to (not renegotiating) this wage
contract.
We now relax the assumption of symmetric information by assuming that σ2
e θ < ∞.
This implies that insiders now observe a noisy signal of individual teacher performance
as well as the public signal coming from average ﬁrm performance. In addition, we also
assume that ﬁrms cannot commit to not modifying the rewards of their employees if this
is in their interests. This is plausible given the various ways in which ﬁrms can enter
into side deals with their employees. Notice that without the asymmetry of information,
ﬁrms had no ability to manipulate incentives by modifying employee rewards, so there
was no need for ﬁrms to commit to wage contracts, hence no commitment problem. The
commitment problem is introduced by the asymmetry of information.
With the asymmetry of information of this sort, and the resulting commitment prob-
lem, ﬁrms become less attractive because, given the ex post manipulation of incentives
inside the team, there will be limits to how much they can reduce the power of the
incentives. More speciﬁcally:
24Proposition 4 Suppose σ2
e θ < ∞.T h e r e e x i s t s σ2
e θ , such that when σ2
e θ > σ2
e θ and γ











induces the second-best level of eﬀort gSB, and is decreasing in σ2
e θ.
When σ2
e θ ≤ σ2
e θ, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved. When σ2
e θ =0 ,t h eﬁrm
equilibrium leads to the market outcome, i.e., the good eﬀort level gM.
(See Appendix for the proof.) As internal signals become more precise, a proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm will always use that extra information to encourage teachers to exert
further bad eﬀort, thus improving outside perception of the average ability of its em-
ployees, and via this channel, its future revenues. This implies that choosing a ﬁrm size
of K∗ (as given by Proposition 3) is no longer a credible commitment to low-powered
incentives and to the second-best level of good eﬀort. Instead, the exact extent of the
strength of incentives will be determined by the amount of information the ﬁrm has
about each employee’s performance. Since the ﬁrm’s (the insiders’) information about
individual performance is also imperfect, i.e., typically, σ2
e θ > 0, average performance
of the ﬁrm is still informative about each employee’s ability. Therefore, ﬁrm size, by
aﬀecting how informative average performance is about individual ability, still inﬂuences
how powerful each employee’s incentives are. Generally, the larger the size of the ﬁrm,
the less information there is about an individual’s performance inside the ﬁrm, and the
less powerful are equilibrium incentives. Therefore, a ﬁrm might still be able to credibly






ing teachers’ incentives even after taking into account the ex post manipulation of these
incentives. Nevertheless, the precision of internal signals puts a lower bound on how
much the ﬁrm can dull incentives through “team production”. In particular, if σ2
e θ ≤ σ2
e θ
for some critical threshold σ2
e θ,t h e nt h e r ei ss u ﬃciently good internal information about
teacher performance that even a very large ﬁrm would not be able to dull incentives
suﬃciently. Therefore, in this case the asymmetry of information, and the resulting
commitment problem, breaks the “ﬁrm equilibrium” of Proposition 3, which achieved
the second-best.
The intuition for why the asymmetry of information and the associated commitment
problem make ﬁrms less useful can be alternatively described as follows: when production
is organized within ﬁrms, individual teachers have relatively weak incentives because of
25the moral-hazard-in-teams problem. The ﬁrm as an entity, or its owner, however, has
strong incentives, since it is the residual claimant of the proﬁts. The problem is whether
these high-powered incentives of the ﬁrm will trickle down to employees. With symmetric
information, the ﬁrm has no way of increasing the incentives of its employees, thus
there is no trickle-down of its high-powered incentives. The asymmetry of information
introduces the possibility that the ﬁrm can manipulate its employees’ incentives, and
this, combined with the inability to commit to observable contracts, makes its high-
powered incentives trickle down to the teachers. As a result, the beneﬁts of ﬁrms in
terms of dulling incentives are reduced or disappear.
5 Incentives in governments
The analysis above highlighted the potential role of ﬁrms in improving eﬃciency through
their ability to suppress information. However, it also pointed out the limitations of
ﬁrms to credibly commit to such a course of action in the presence of the informational
asymmetries between the ﬁrm and the outside world. Let us now imagine a world with
γ>γ , so that markets provide too high-powered incentives, and with σ2
e θ small so that
ﬁrms cannot commit to dulling individual incentives because of severe asymmetries of
information between insiders and outsiders. In particular, let us assume σ2
e θ =0 ,w h i c h
implies that ﬁrms will be unable to solve the over-incentivization problem, and gM (the
market equilibrium) is also the ﬁrm equilibrium. Can government operation reduce
incentives below those implied by ﬁrms and markets?
The answer may be yes, since governments are often thought to provide relatively
lower-powered incentives than markets and ﬁrms. There are a variety of reasons for
low-powered incentives in governments, ranging from the absence of market discipline
(Niskanen [1971], Hanushek [1996]) to an optimal design to avoid collusion and corrup-
tion (e.g., Crozier [1967], Tirole [1986], Banerjee [1997]). In our model, we can think
of these concerns imposing a wage structure on government organizations of the form
wi
t = αGmi
t + κ.I fαG were close to αSB, i.e., incentives in government-run ﬁrms were
close to the power of incentives necessary to achieve the second-best, government orga-
nization would be useful.20
20The analysis in this section simply points out when government operation may be preferred over
markets and ﬁrms. We do not oﬀer a political economy model determining when government operation
26In addition to factors outside our model leading to low-powered incentives in govern-
ment, there are also endogenous reasons in our model enabling governments to manip-
ulate the power of incentives diﬀerently than proﬁt-maximizing organizations. We now
discuss these issues using a highly stylized model of government organization whereby
the government (a politician) decides the size of schools and individual rewards. This
politician is potentially self-interested. Moreover, similar to individual teachers in our
analysis so far, she would like to convince the market (the voters) that she has high
ability.


















where Ct+τ i st h ec o s tp e rs t u d e n to ft h es c h o o l i n gs y s t e m ,o rCt+τ = w
ij
t+τ. This utility
function implies that the politician always likes to convince parents (or the voters) that
he has high ability, and faces a cost in terms of the expenditures on the education budget










t is i.i.d. with ε v N(0,σ2
p) just as in equation (1).
We will discuss incentives provided by government ownership/operation under two
diﬀerent scenarios: (1) “no politician eﬀects”, so that the ability and actions of the politi-
cian do not matter for student performance (other than through the incentives provided
to teachers); (2) “politician eﬀects,” so that the ability of the politician inﬂuences the
human capital of students, for example, because the politician takes actions that aﬀect
teacher incentives through other means, or inﬂuences the curriculum, etc.
5.1 Government operation with “no politician eﬀects”
We start with the case where the politician’s ability or action does not matter for student
performance–except through the politician’s manipulation of teachers’ incentives. This
immediately implies that no action that the politician can take will send a positive signal
will actually arise in equilibrium.
27about her ability. This removes the commitment problem faced by ﬁrms. Therefore, the
politician can choose, and commit to, the allocation of Proposition 3. In particular, she






to each teacher, replicating the allocation of Proposition 3, which, as shown earlier,
coincides with the second-best. Alternatively, the politician can simply set the wage of
each teacher equal to wi
t = αSBmi
t + κ.
This is true even when the politician has superior information about teacher test
scores relative to the market, i.e., observes a signal s
jk
t like in (14) with σ2
e θ < ∞.
Although she can reward individual teachers on the basis of this additional signal, s
jk
t ,
a n de n c o u r a g et h e mt oe x e r tm o r eg o o da n db a de ﬀort, the resulting increase in test
scores will not lead to a better voter belief about her ability, since a higher average test
score will not constitute a positive signal about ability, a
p
t. As a result, the politician
has no reason to manipulate teacher incentives. This enables government organizations
to commit to low-powered incentives.
5.2 Government operation with “politician eﬀects”
The above analysis may be criticized because there is no room for the actions of the
politician to inﬂuence outcomes other than through her eﬀect on teacher eﬀort. This
means that the politician has no incentive to “inﬂate” student performance, and could
easily provide, and commit to, the second-best incentives for teachers. In general, de-
cisions taken by education ministers or prime ministers can have important inﬂuences
on aggregate outcomes, for example, through teacher selection, by aﬀecting incentives
in other dimensions or by inﬂuencing the curriculum. We allow for this possibility in
a simple way by assuming that the ability of the politician also matters for the human
capital attained by the children. In particular, assume that the human capital of a
student taught by teacher k in school j is
h
jk









t is the ability of the politician in charge of the schooling system. This formula-
tion implies that the politician’s ability inﬂuences the human capital of all the children
in the school system, because of some other dimension of incentives that the politician
provides to teachers, or because of his decisions. Consequently, the politician has an
28incentive to inﬂate test scores in order to improve others’ perception of his own ability.
The point that we want to make is that even in this case, the government may have a
comparative advantage in providing low-powered incentives. When an individual school
inﬂates its own test scores, this has a negative eﬀect on other schools because of the
r e l a t i v ep e r f o r m a n c ee v a l u a t i o nu s e db yt h em a r k e tt or e m o v et h ee ﬀect of the common
shock, ηt. This intensiﬁes the negative externality, and encourages private schools to
give high-powered incentives to their teachers. In contrast, with government operation,
the politician is in charge of the whole school system, so when citizens (voters) update
their beliefs about the ability of the politician, the common shock is not ﬁltered out, and
acts as an additional source of noise, thus weakening the incentives of the politician.
More formally, parents (or voters) observe all test scores, and update their beliefs





















































where n0 is the number of ﬁrms in the economy, ¯ A is the average ability of teachers in
the population, and si
t refers to the average test score of ﬁrm i at time t. These updat-
ing equations have an intuition similar to (4) and (5). The updating is now about the
ability of the politician. For updating, only the average test score in the population is
relevant, and along the rational expectations equilibrium path, this average test score
is equal to λa
p
t +( 1− λ) ¯ A + f(gt)+γf(bt)+ηt. The career-concerns coeﬃcient of the
politician, β
p,i sd i ﬀerent from that of ﬁrms (or individual teachers), β, because learning
now is about the ability of the politician, which may have a diﬀerent distribution, and
more importantly, because noise comes from the aggregate shock, ηt, not from the stu-
dent performance shocks, the θt’s. Here the absence of relative performance evaluation
(yardstick competition) with government operation is important. The reason why σ2
η did
29n o tf e a t u r ei nt h eu p d a t i n ge q u a t i o n s( 4 )a n d( 5 )i st h a tr e l a t i v ep e r f o r m a n c ee v a l u a t i o n
eliminated this aggregate shock. With government operation, relative performance eval-
uation is not possible, since everything is run by the government,21 and this makes (the
perception of) government performance dependent on the realization of the aggregate
shock. As a result, the politician receives credit for only part of the improvements in
test scores, weakening his incentives, and therefore, indirectly those of the whole gov-
ernment organization. The greater σ2
η, i.e., the more important the aggregate shock, the
smaller β
p, and the weaker the incentives in governments. In the limit, as σ2
η →∞ ,t h e
politician has completely ﬂat incentives.
We have determined the incentives that a politician running government schools faces
from the voters, but the real outcome that we are interested in is the level of eﬀort chosen
by the teachers under government ownership, gG.T h i s e ﬀort level will be determined
by the incentives trickling down to the individual teacher level. Given the politician’s
own incentives in (20), we can determine the wage schedule that the politician will oﬀer
to each of his teachers. In particular, assume that the politician oﬀers each teacher a








where κ is some constant. First, consider the case where the level of incentives provided
to teachers α
p
t+τ is observable. Then, even though the politician can manipulate teacher
incentives, he will receive no beneﬁt from this, since voters will eﬀectively observe the
level of good and bad eﬀort exerted by teachers. In this case, the results would be
identical to that with no politician eﬀects, and the politician would simply choose α
p
t+τ =
αSB and achieve the second-best.
However, parallel to our treatment of ﬁrms where teacher incentives inside the ﬁrm
are not observed by outsiders, it may be more reasonable to presume that α
p
t+τsa r en o t
observable citizens. Interestingly, even in this case, government operation can provide
weaker incentives than markets and ﬁrms. We now discuss this case.
21This argument needs to be qualiﬁed when local politicians run local school districts, for example,
as in the U.S. In this case, there will be some amount of competition even with government opera-
tion. Nevertheless, given the importance of district-speciﬁc shocks, the extent of yardstick competition
might be much less than the case of private ownership, with competition between private schools, thus
qualitatively leading to the same type of comparison as that emphasized in this section.
30The question which arises is, given her own incentives determined by β
p, what level of
αp will the politician choose for the teachers? We can answer this question by maximizing
the objective function of the politician given by (18). Since the government acts as a
monopolist, it will only give each teacher their minimum reservation utility. Let u be the
spot reservation utility of a teacher putting in zero eﬀort. Then the government must
pay each teacher a wage equal to (u+gt +bt) each period where gt and bt are the eﬀort










t ) each period.
Plugging the wage function into (18) and maximizing with respect to α
p
t+τ g i v e su st h e
following result:
Proposition 5 Suppose that σ2
e θ =0and γ>γ . Then both markets and ﬁrms lead to
t h es a m ei n e ﬃciently high level of eﬀort gM >g SB, with gM given by Proposition 2. On









We have gG <g M if and only if β
p <β .β
p is decreasing in σ2
η and increasing in λ.
The proposition establishes that government operation often provides weaker incen-
tives than ﬁrms and markets, even when politicians have an interest in inﬂating test
scores, and the manipulation of teacher incentives by the politician is not observed by
voters. The reason is the presence of common shocks (hence the importance of σ2
η), which
were ﬁltered out in markets, but not under government operation. Common shocks are
not ﬁltered out, thereby increasing the amount of noise in the performance, and thus
weakening the incentives of politicians. These weaker incentives then trickle down to
the teachers.
More speciﬁcally, when β
p <β , government organization provides less high-powered
incentives than markets and ﬁrms, because the politician has less to gain by inﬂating
test scores. This is likely to be the case when aggregate shocks are large, i.e., when
σ2
η is large, and when the contribution of the politician to aggregate test scores, λ,a n d
the room for the politician to prove that he has high ability, σ2
p, are limited. This also
suggests that government operation may be beneﬁcial in reducing incentives in activities
where there is more scope for unproductive signaling eﬀort and politicians have limited
room to manipulate aggregate performance to improve their standing. In contrast, when
31σ2
η is small, and/or when λ and σ2
p are large, politicians can manipulate incentives more
than proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, and government ownership/operation is likely to lead to
a deterioration in the allocation of resources.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has provided a simple model to analyze incentives in markets, ﬁrms and
governments when consumers only have access to noisy signals of output quality. Our
analysis suggests that competitive markets work well when eﬀort and investment are
important relative to the ability of agents to manipulate quality (i.e., small γ in terms
of Proposition 1). When output signals/quality can be manipulated, markets typically
yield too high-powered incentives, and consequently agents distort the composition of
their eﬀorts.
Firms can help in such situations by suppressing some information, thus dulling
incentives. Nevertheless, the ability of ﬁrms to reduce the power of incentives may be
limited because ﬁr m st h e m s e l v e sa r ep r o ﬁt-maximizing organizations and would like to
s i g n a lt ot h em a r k e tt h a tt h ea v e r a g ep e r f o r m a n c eo ft h eﬁrm in the future will be
good. Therefore, ﬁrm owners (or ﬁrms themselves as entities) will have an incentive
to encourage their employees to distort their eﬀorts. In other words, the high-powered
incentives of ﬁrms coming from proﬁt maximization are likely to trickle down to their
employees.
This is where governments may potentially lead to better outcomes due to their abil-
ity to provide relatively low-powered incentives to workers. This may arise naturally if
governments provide low-powered incentives for other reasons (which is often argued to
be the case, and suggested as a reason for the ineﬃciency of government operation in
many activities). More interestingly, in the presence of common shocks, there is a nat-
ural reason for governments to have a comparative advantage in providing low-powered
incentives–the presence of common shocks leads to yardstick competition among ﬁrms,
whereby an improvement in one ﬁrm’s signal (or more generally, observed output) has
a negative impact on the evaluation of the remaining ﬁrms. Proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms do
not take this externality into account, contributing further to high-powered incentives.
Government ownership internalizes this negative externality, reducing the power of in-
32centives. Intuitively, a self-interested politician knows that she will obtain only limited
credit for improvements in aggregate performance if there are large aggregate shocks.
This consideration is absent when production is organized in ﬁrms, since what matters
is, at least in part, comparison to other ﬁrms.
Our analysis also suggests a theory for why certain occupations should supply their
services in markets, while others should be organized in ﬁrms, and yet others should be
under government operation. There are limits to this theory, however, since in actual
practice, many other factors are undoubtedly important, and the boundaries of markets,
ﬁrms, and governments are not simply, or perhaps even mainly, determined as a way of
regulating the power of incentives. For example, governments may run certain functions
for rent-seeking reasons. Nevertheless, the arguments developed in this paper might
suggest a reason for why government ownership in some activities make be less costly
than in others, and thus help us understand which activities we are more likely to
see government involvement. Overall, the importance of the forces emphasized here is
therefore an empirical question. We believe that an empirical investigation of relative
eﬃciency of markets, ﬁr m sa n dg o v e r n m e n t si nd i ﬀerent activities, taking into account
issues of relative output quality and composition of eﬀort, would be a fruitful area for
future research.
A major element missing from our analysis is political economy: the fact that politi-
cians have non-proﬁt maximizing incentives and respond to their political constituencies
may have important bearing on the incentives provided in government organizations,
and the types of actions to which government organizations can and cannot commit.
Work incorporating the interaction between the power of incentives and political econ-
omy considerations may be another fruitful area for future research.
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Proof of Lemma 1: A l t h o u g hi nt h et e x tw ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r en →∞ ,h e r e w e
solve for the general case with n ﬁnite ﬁrst. Parents with prior mi
t about teacher i observe
the vector Zt.L e tvt b et h ev a r i a n c eo fmi
t.S i n c emi
t and Zt are distributed normally,
we can use the normal updating formula to update the ability prior and compute mi
t+1







22 (Zt − Mt),
where Mt =[ m1
t ........ mn
t ]T, Σ12 =[ 00..vt.... 0], with the convention that vt corresponds



















Σ22 is an (nxn) matrix with (vt + σ2
θ + σ2
η) as the diagonal term, and σ2
η as all the
non-diagonal terms. Σ
−1


































+( n − 2)
¸
.
Plugging in the value of Σ12 and Σ
−1










































Note that 1 >β≥ β>0.
Next, we need to solve for vt.L i k e mi
t,v t is also updated each period after the
realization of Zt. This updating formula is given by:
vt+1 = vt − Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21 + σ
2
ε,
where Σ12 and Σ22 are deﬁned above and Σ21 =[ Σ12]T. Therefore, we have








Since we are interested in the long-run stationary equilibrium, we impose the condi-
























































.( A 3 )


















































35It can be easily checked from (A4) that 0 <β<1,
∂β
∂σ2




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :The second-best is given by the solution to (7). Notice
that (7) is a point-wise maximization problem over time. The constraint can then be
























.( A 6 )
The inverse of f0(x) exists due to the concavity of f(x).E q u a t i o n( A 6 )d e ﬁnes the feasible
pairs of (gt+τ,b t+τ) even when the wage function is not diﬀerentiable. Restriction to
diﬀerentiable wage functions therefore does not change our second-best solution. Given















The above is a well-deﬁned maximization problem with a unique global maximum. More-
o v e r ,b e c a u s eo ft h ea d d i t i v en a t u r eo f( A 7 ) ,a tt h eo p t i m u m ,gSB
t = gSB
t0 = gSB for all






Because of the concavity of f(x), the expression on the RHS is greater than 1, implying
gSB <g FB.
Given gSB, it is easy to solve for the optimal wage structure. In fact there is a





∂st+k )=1 . This condition can be satisﬁed by the wage schedule wi
t =
αSBmi
t + κ. To see this, note that from (4), we can write
mt+l =( 1− β)
lmt + β(1 − β)
l−1st + β(1 − β)
l−2st+1 + .... + βst+l−1 + constant.
36We can then write
∂wt+k+l
∂st+k = αβ(1 − β)l−1, which implies that at the second-best
α
SB =
1 − δ(1 − β)
f0(gSB)βδ
.
Since gSB is decreasing in γ,t h e r ee x i s t saγ such that for γ>γ ,α SB < 1. ¥

















The are J ﬁrms in the economy with each ﬁrm j having a size Kj. Then using the











22 (Zt − Mt),







Kj.... 0],w i t h
vF
jt
Kj corresponding to the jth





































as the diagonal term, and σ2
η as all the non-
diagonal terms. Now take the limit n →∞ ,w h i c h ,s i n c eKj < ∞ for all j, implies
J →∞ .T h e nΣ
−1











































































































Notice that the stationary ﬁrm variance is the same as the individual teacher stationary
variance under the market equilibrium. Similarly, as J →∞ ,β F → vF
vF+σ2





t ) → ηt. In other words, as J →∞ , the career concerns coeﬃcient for the
entire ﬁrm is exactly the same as the career concerns coeﬃcient for an individual teacher
under market equilibrium. However, the career-concerns coeﬃcient for an individual k
in ﬁrm j is given by
β
Kj, and is decreasing in Kj.
From this, it is straightforward to see that gF(1) = gM and gF(Kj) → 0 as Kj →∞ .
Moreover, gF(Kj) is monotonically decreasing in Kj. The ﬁrm will now endogenously
















As we saw in Proposition 1, (A8) is maximized at Kj = K∗, such that g(K∗)=gSB,
providing the second-best solution. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Let n →∞so that with each ﬁrm of ﬁnite size, J →∞ .
As before, this assumption implies that the common shocks can be perfectly ﬁltered
38out, so to simplify notation, we ignore the common shocks. Since there is asymmetric
information now, we must distinguish between internal and public information. The










while the public information is given by: z
j
t = at + θ
j
t.T h e ﬁrm has access to both



















































































deﬁnes the career concerns coeﬃcient with asymmetric information, superscript −k refers











e θ)(K − 1)
.
Once again the stationary variance vF will be given by vF
t+1 = vF
t = vF,w h i c ha f t e r
applying the normal updating formula is given by the implicit equation,












To emphasize dependence on ﬁrm size, let us write the career concerns coeﬃcient
above, β
asy,a sβ
asy (K). Let K∗∗ be the value of K that makes β
asy (K)=βSB. Then
we have that ∂K∗∗
∂σ2
e θ
< 0. In other words, as the ﬁrm learns more about an individual




∂K < 0,a n dβ
asy(K =1 )=βM, all we need to show[? SHOW—LOOK
COMBO IS WEIRD] for β
asy (K)=βSB in equilibrium is to look at the limit limK→∞
β
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e θ > σ2
e θ, the economy can achieve the second-best allocation. However,
for σ2
e θ ≤ σ2
e θ (i.e., severe asymmetric information), the commitment problem implies that
the second-best can never be achieved. ¥
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t+τ ﬁxed, and maximizing over α
p
t+τ,w e





































We know that teachers’ ﬁrst-order conditions imply that f
0(g)=γf
0(b). This simpliﬁes












thus completing the proof.¥
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